And now my response. As I see it there are two kinds of guard players, those that play using guard tactics, and those that don't. Some Commanders (especially those grounded in the military traditions of the less refined though more populous geopolitical entities) would see themselves as the sword and shield of the masses, the same social and tactical organics that echo the mentality of those who would overwhelm you with mindless barbarism of tyranids or orks. Alternatively, there are those that think themselves as nothing more than a short step down from Space Marines, believing that if they spend 16 points on a model, or 200 points on a tank, it will be every bit as good as a model of the same price on another list. Both fail to see that the strength of the Guard is neither in the weight of their steel nor in the weight of their numbers. Rather it is their outstanding flexibility, their ability to combine those attributes that finds the guard as formidable as it is often found to be. Infantry And tanks should be the hammer and anvil a skilled commander uses together to forge victory.
Tanks should not be seen as the hammer as they often are by those who would proclaim themselves "treadheads" will oft spout them to be. Rather, the true heart and hammer of any guard force is and should be the infantry. Armour should not be used to frighten the enemy into submission but rather as a logistical method of increasing the survivability of a battle group as a whole. Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. For a commander with limited manpower, Armour is a tool to help even the odds. For every one man firing an antitank weapon at this lumbering behemoth, there are nine more hopelessly distracted from the real threat, even as prescribed by their own general staff.
This threat can be presented in two ways, depending on the foe. The first, favored by those who are the real masters of armoured warfare would see rapidly deployed transports full of good units supported by either the cheapest and most readily available fighting force the commander has at his disposal, or less expensive vehicles to take the heat. this will of course depend on the size of the battle and the type of terrain, but either way, one will find these mechanized units a far superior attacking thrust to the much venerated Battle Tank. One must keep in mind that the engine of the Panzer is a weapon just as the main-gun. though it should also be noted that the moment mobility is lost en masse, the day may well as be also.
The other, and arguably more flexible, if more vulnerable deployment sees a greater investment in cheap man power as a whole. Though it can be configured to tackle all sorts of possible threats, its greatest weakness is that without the other half of the equation, that anvil of heavy tanks, the day can be hopelessly lost, for no matter what resources are put into fielding these troop formations, they can never hope to match the numbers available to the enemy (excepting they be something on the order of a space marine formation). In a man to man fight, the winner is he who has one more round in his magazine.
In conclusion, the guard army is what it is, and that is the forefront of combined arms tactics on the battlefield of the 41st Mellenium.
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